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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical
Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their
preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International
Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/
IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research
papers for the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary
and Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and
financial issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000
the studies are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International
Development at Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Government of
Denmark, as well as contributions from the countries participating in the meetings of
the  G-24.INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS: OPERATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORLD BANK
Ravi Kanbur
Cornell University
G-24 Discussion Paper No. 19
December 2002vii International Financial Institutions and International Public Goods
Abstract
The global International Financial Institutions (IFIs) increasingly justify their
operations in terms of the provision of International Public Goods (IPGs). This is partly
because there appears to be support among the rich countries of the North for
expenditures on these IPGs, in contrast to the “aid fatigue” that afflicts the channelling
of country specific assistance. But do the IFIs necessarily have to be involved in the
provision of IPGs? If they do, what are the terms and conditions of that engagement?
How does current practice compare to the ideal? And what reforms are needed to move
us closer to the ideal? These are the questions that this paper attempts to ask, in the
framework of the theory of International Public Goods, and in light of the practice of
International Financial Institutions, the World Bank in particular. For the World Bank,
a series of specific operational and resource reallocation implications are drawn from
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I. Introduction
When people talk of the International Finan-
cial Institutions (IFIs), they mean the two Bretton
Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. Of course, strictly speaking,
any multilateral organization with financial opera-
tions is an IFI – for example, the regional multilateral
banks, regional monetary authorities, some agencies
of the United Nations Organization that disburse
funding, etc. However, in practice, by IFIs is meant
the two global IFIs – the Fund and the Bank. In re-
cent years there has been growing discussion of the
role of these institutions in the provision of Interna-
tional Public Goods (IPGs). An aid fatigued public
in the rich North, beset by its own internal budget-
ary problems (for example, the looming social
security crisis of an ageing population) and con-
vinced by tales of waste and corruption in aid flows,
has grown weary and wary of conventional country-
specific development assistance. In contrast, the
notion of IPGs seems attractive to Northern publics
– at least their representatives have adopted the IPG
refrain in international fora.2
But what exactly is an IPG? Given the “aura”
that the term seems to have developed, there is clearly
an incentive to justify any activity by any agency as
an IPG, and aid agencies have not been shy in doing
this. At its most general level, development in poor
countries is being argued to be an IPG, and hence an
argument for continuing conventional aid – disen-
chantment with which turned the Northern public to
IPGs in the first place. On the other hand, highly
specific activities like research into vaccines for
tropical diseases are also being labelled as the pro-
vision of an international public good. If we are not
careful, everything will be labelled an IPG, and the
concept will lose not only its analytical cutting
power, but also its capacity to mobilize Northern
resources.
This paper begins by carefully defining IPGs
and characterizing their key dimensions (section II).
It argues that the concept is subtle and multifaceted,
and that in practice there are many different types of
IPGs. The mechanisms for provision of these IPGs
need to be equally subtle and multifaceted. The IFIs
have not been slow off the mark in claiming the
mantle of “IPG providers”, but the theory of IPGs
provides a framework in which to evaluate the claims
of the IFIs for resources in the name of IPGs. The
paper discusses World Bank practice for specific
IPGs (section III), and then considers reforms to
better articulate the comparative advantage of the
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Bank with the requirements of IPG provision (sec-
tion IV). The paper concludes (section V) with an
outline of areas for further research and analysis.
II. IPG theory
As noted above, there is an understandable ten-
dency to fit almost any IFI activity under the IPG
umbrella – for example, financial support for vac-
cine research, in-house economic research on
development, capacity building for research in de-
veloping countries, collation and dissemination of
research, convening international summits on glo-
bal pollution, developing international trading
mechanisms for national pollution permits, multi-
country environmental and water preservation
projects, raising money from financial markets at
lower cost, disseminating and evaluating informa-
tion on economic and financial conditions in
individual countries, developing and monitoring of
banking standards, coordinating aid flows from dis-
parate donors, etc.
It is important at the outset to clarify terms and
set up a clear framework for identifying IPGs and
their key characteristics.3 The technical definition
of a pure public good is a commodity or activity
whose benefits are non-rival and non-excludable. By
non-rival is meant that one entity benefiting from it
does not diminish the benefit to another entity. By
non-excludable is meant that no entity can in fact be
denied the benefit. An international public good is
one where the entities in question are conceptual-
ized as nations rather than individuals. There are
two important points to be made with regard to these
two criteria. First, although they help sharp concep-
tualization, in most practical cases they will only be
met partially. Second, while rivalry can be character-
ized as a property given by technology, excludability
is man made.
IPGs relate very closely to spillover effects or
externalities between countries, and it is worth clari-
fying the concept of such international externalities.
Consider a collection of nation states that have ju-
risdictional authority and control over different
policy instruments within their own boundaries.
However, there are spillover effects of events and
policies in one country on other countries, near and
far. Civil war in one country sends refugees into near
neighbours. Carbon dioxide emissions from one
country affect all countries through their impact on
global climate. Water use in one country lowers the
available water supply for others who share the same
water table. Infectious diseases incubated in one
place spread to another. Financial contagion, as the
name suggests, spreads from country to country; lack
of confidence in one country’s financial future may
unfairly taint other countries in a peer group. Ac-
tivities that mitigate negative externalities and
promote positive ones then satisfy the criteria defin-
ing IPGs.
All of the above are examples of cross-border
externalities, spillovers that are not mediated by com-
petitive markets. Certain key features of these
spillovers will be relevant for our discussion of IPGs
and IFIs. The first feature to highlight is the spread
of the spillover – what sorts of countries are involved
at the two ends of the spillover? It is useful to distin-
guish between (i) spillovers across developing
countries only and (ii) spillovers that include both
developing and developed countries. The next fea-
ture to consider is the direction of the spillover – is
it unidirectional or does the spillover go both ways?
Characterization of this is a subtle and intricate
matter, and is not independent of the particular cir-
cumstances of time and place. The standard example
of a multidirectional spillover currently is air pollu-
tion, where developed and developing countries are
inflicting spillovers on each other. Farm protection
policies in North America and the European Union,
which create a surplus and depress world prices, are
a unidirectional spillover from developed to devel-
oping countries. Infectious diseases are in principle
multidirectional but in the specific conditions of to-
day the issue is framed as a unidirectional one – poor
infectious disease control in developing countries
leading (though travel) to spread in developed coun-
tries.
Perhaps the most famous example of a unidi-
rectional spillover, at least as it is portrayed in much
of the current discussion, is development itself. This
argument is being used with increasing force by do-
nor agencies in general, and the IFIs in particular, to
justify maintenance and increase of official devel-
opment assistance. But there are at least two caveats
that must be registered. The first is a certain unease
with the “there’s something in it for us” line of argu-
ment bolstering the case for development assistance
in the face of an aid-fatigued public. While recog-
nizing that this seems to be working at the moment,
at least if statements of politicians are anything to
go by, it can be argued that this undermines the more
solid moral basis for assistance based on a common
humanity and alleviating suffering.3 International Financial Institutions and International Public Goods
The second caveat is perhaps more pertinent
for the discussion in this paper, and is in any case
relevant to the critique noted above. This is that the
whole argument rests on the assumption that the
transfer in question actually makes the recipient bet-
ter off. The theoretical literature in international
economics is replete with analyses showing how the
paradox of an immiserizing transfer can occur. In-
deed, one can theoretically get a situation where the
transfer makes the donor better off and the recipient
worse off – and many NGOs have argued that this is
what the aid system, bilateral and multilateral, actu-
ally does. The evidence on the efficacy of aid in
promoting development is decidedly mixed and,
before the IFIs and other agencies are allowed to use
the “development is good for developed countries
too” argument, they should be subjected to the scru-
tiny of whether aid is actually good for development.4
This paper will not elaborate further on the
“development and poverty reduction in poor coun-
tries is an IPG” argument. In other words, it will not
deal any further with the generalized unidirectional
externality from lack of development in poor coun-
tries to the well being of rich countries (and other
poor countries). Rather, it will focus on more spe-
cific activities that (i) although taking place primarily
in developed countries, imply a unidirectional posi-
tive externality to several developing countries
simultaneously, (ii) coordinate multidirectional ex-
ternalities among groups of developing countries and
(iii) benefit developed and developing countries si-
multaneously, the benefits in all cases being non-rival
and non-excludable.
A leading example of the first type of public
good is basic research, on tropical agriculture or
medicine or even, some would argue, on the devel-
opment process itself. Examples of the second
category of public goods are regional or sub-regional
level agreements on transport or water. Finally, glo-
bal mechanisms to control carbon dioxide emissions,
or financial contagion, are example of the third type
of public good.
In the case of multidirectional spillovers,
whether between developing countries or between
developed and developing countries, the central is-
sue is one of coordination failure – each country
ignores the negative consequences of its actions on
others. All countries could be better off if they took
this into account and coordinated their actions. In
this case it is the coordination mechanism that is the
IPG. Once coordination is in place, countries as a
whole benefit, and it is not easy to exclude any one
country from this pool of benefit (otherwise why
would it want to coordinate?). However, very many
different types of coordination are possible, which
determine not only the total gains but also the divi-
sion of these gains. There is thus a range of possible
IPGs each with different consequences for different
countries.
This last point leads to a very important con-
sideration. Coordination mechanisms may satisfy the
technical definition of an International Public Good,
but it is important to analyse the distribution of ben-
efits from the coordination – in particular, how are
they divided between developing and developed
countries? To the extent that the benefits are very
unevenly divided against developing countries, what
we might have is not so much an IPG as a cartel of
developed countries pursuing their own interests.
This distinction between an IPG and an international
cartel is well worth bearing in mind as we move to a
discussion of IFI practice.
The final theoretical consideration5 follows
from the principle of subsidiarity. This says that all
other things being equal, the coordination mecha-
nism must be as close as possible to the jurisdictions
being coordinated. Under this rubric, there is a pri-
ori no strong argument for a global institution to
coordinate the water rights problems of three coun-
tries in Africa – rather, it should be an institution as
close to the three countries as possible. Economies
of scale may suggest a regional level institution to
deal with coordination issues between countries in
that region – but it is unlikely that they will suggest
a global level institution, capable of tackling coor-
dination problems across any group of countries
anywhere in the world. Going against this argument
is one on economies of scope – that IPG issues in a
particular sector (for example, health) could best be
combined under a single institution (like the World
Health Organization). In practice we may end up with
a combination of regional and technical institutions
to handle coordination problems within developing
countries.6 But the claims of a global institution to
do all jobs should be treated sceptically.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 19
III. World Bank practice
How does the actual practice of the IFIs com-
pare to the theory of IPGs? How much of what they
do can be faithfully characterized as IPGs? The Bank
and the Fund are of course complex entities with
multifaceted operations in scores of countries and
many sectors. They are also controlled primarily by
the developed countries, especially by the Group
of 7. It will be important to bear this political fact
in mind and also to be clear which parts of their op-
erations are being discussed e.g. financial versus
research, country specific versus multi-country, etc.)
and the criteria for evaluation. The bulk of the op-
erations of the two institutions are country specific
in nature and this is unlikely to change in the future.
In this paper we focus on the World Bank. Of
its administrative budget of around $1.4 billion in
fiscal year 2001, about half went directly to support
country operations (“Regions”).7 If we take away the
“overhead” expenditure of administration, corporate
management etc., the share of country operations is
even higher. This therefore raises two questions.
First, to what extent can their country specific op-
erations take on the mantle of international public
goods? Second, is there a case for a shift to more of
their operations being multi-country in nature, and
what would this entail? Under multi-country activi-
ties, research and dissemination of research (the
budget headings of Development Economics and
World Bank Institute) account, for around $100
million of the total administrative budget. The De-
velopment Grant Facility, from which a range of
global activities is funded in the form of grants, was
around $150 million in fiscal year 2001. “Networks”
account for almost $120 million – it is not clear how
much of this allocation is for multi-country activi-
ties and how much for supporting country operations,
but if we allocate 1 in 8 (roughly, the ratio of re-
search and dissemination to research, dissemination
and country operations) of this to multi-country ac-
tivities, we get $265 million ($100 million + $150
million + $15 million) as the allocation of the ad-
ministrative budget to this category, compared to
$805 million ($700 million + $105 million) to coun-
try specific activities.8
It is important to realize that any evaluation of
the Bank will stand and fall, for many years to come,
by the efficacy of its country specific operations.
Let us focus, however, on the non-country specific
operations. We start from IPGs for small groups of
developing countries and work our way up to global
IPGs. What is striking is that multi-country opera-
tions across small groups of developing countries
facing cross-border externalities are few and far be-
tween. To the extent that they exist, they are generally
outside the normal realm of Bank instruments, rely-
ing on grants from the Bank’s net income, rather than
loans from IBRD or IDA. The hugely successful
River Blindness project is often produced as an ex-
ample where the Bank supplied an IPG in which (in
concert with other donors) a multi-country project
was put into place to counter a vector borne disease
– a classic negative externality across geographically
adjacent countries, mitigating which benefited these
countries in a manner that was at least partly non-
rival and non-excludable.9
But there are at least two questions that arise,
in light of the theoretical discussion in the previous
section. First, does the Bank necessarily have to be
involved in such IPGs? The principle of subsidiarity
suggests that it should be regional institutions that
should prima facie have the responsibility for these
activities. Even if it can be argued that at the time of
the project regional institutions in Africa were not
strong enough to take over this task, and even if they
are not strong enough now, should we not be aiming
for a time when they will be capable of supplying
such localized IPGs? Second, how, if at all, can the
Bank’s standard loan instruments be used in the sup-
ply of such public goods? To the extent that they
cannot, this surely implies a move in the direction
of more grant financing from the Bank as a whole.
These questions will be taken up in the next section.
Staying with multi-country coordination, let us
move to the case where the coordination required is
across developing and developed countries – in other
words, a truly global coordination mechanism, the
supply of which would undoubtedly count as the
supply of an IPG. The Bank is involved in a number
of these types of exercises. The global coordination
(jointly with the IMF) of debt relief for the poorest
countries (the HIPC initiative) is a leading example.
It is clear that even for a single debtor country with
many creditors there is a major coordination prob-
lem in debt relief, since it is in the interest of every
creditor to be repaid at the expense of the other credi-
tors. Such coordination mechanisms exist for
commercial debt (London Club) and official bilat-
eral debt (Paris Club), but there needs to be a
mechanism for coordination across these, as well as
of course for multilateral debt itself. Some of the
debt issues are quite intricate – for example, the
Soviet era debt owed to Russia by African countries,
while Russia is itself a debtor to Western nations.5 International Financial Institutions and International Public Goods
The case for coordination is strong, but not without
questions. Should the Bank be involved at all or
should this be left to the IMF? How can either the
Bank (or the IMF) be a legitimate coordinator be-
tween creditors and debtors when its own debt is at
stake?
A second leading example of coordination
across developing and developed countries would
be the Bank’s work in the environment, especially
air pollution. Global coordination problems on the
use of the seas, on fishing disputes, etc. are dealt
with by specialized agencies of the United Nations
and various trade organizations, and the Bank does
not have a major role. However, for the case of car-
bon dioxide emissions or ozone depletion the Bank
has taken a lead role in conjunction with United
Nations agencies such as UNDP and UNEP. The
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), for example,
was incubated in the Bank but it is now a separate
entity, with the Bank listed as an implementing
agency, through its regular country operations in
countries that participate in GEF projects. This shows
another aspect of practice that is of interest. Global
coordination will often require country specific
projects. To the extent that the Bank’s country pro-
grammes purposively finance such projects (for
example, the Aquatic Biodiversity Conservation
project in Bangladesh as a part of the overall objec-
tive of global biodiversity conservation) they are part
of the supply of IPGs. But this raises yet more ques-
tions. What is the trade off between resources for
such projects and resources for national development
pure and simple? And is it better to use loan or grant
instruments for such projects?
Consider now a non-rival, non-excludable and
unidirectional positive externality from activities
primarily in the developed countries, or in the IFIs,
to developing countries as a whole. One example
would be generalized lifting of trade barriers, or
immigration restrictions against developing countries
by developed ones. But the more commonly dis-
cussed examples are basic research – for example,
into tropical agriculture, tropical diseases, or into
the development process itself.
Rather like the River Blindness project, the
work of the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is often used by the
Bank as an example of an IPG that it is instrumental
in helping to supply. Despite the usual problems of
an ageing institution, most evaluations of CGIAR
generally applaud its achievements in helping to in-
crease agricultural yields in developing countries as
a whole. Indeed they call on it to do more, in light of
the slowdown in yield growth that has been experi-
enced in the last fifteen years. There is a strong
argument for increased financial support of the
CGIAR, subject to the usual caveats of institutional
reform. By extension, there is strong argument for
the Bank to increase its support, which is in the form
of grants from its net income. But notice an interest-
ing point. Whatever the Bank’s initial role in getting
CGIAR off the ground (it can be argued that Foun-
dations such as Rockefeller played an even more
crucial incubating role), its current contribution is
essentially as a financier (through its Development
Grant Facility) rather than provider of substantive
input (for example, based on its country operations).
This raises again a question on the link between the
Bank’s role as an IPG provider and its bread and
butter country-specific operations.
Similar to the Bank’s contribution to the
CGIAR, its contribution to various proposed funds
for research into diseases prevalent in developing
countries satisfies the criteria for helping the supply
of an IPG. Basic research that leads to an anti-
malaria vaccine, for example, could benefit poor
countries enormously. While this benefit will of
course depend on the specifics of how the vaccine
is disseminated, the output of the research itself is
non-rival, and furthermore non-excludable provided
the right institutional framework is in place that does
not create private property rights in its findings. As
is well known, the development community faces a
difficult trade-off between using the private sector’s
efficiency in pursuing research goals, and giving
private property rights on the outcomes as an in-
centive, since the benefits would not then be
non-excludable. There is the added issue that
vaccines or treatments for the diseases of poor peo-
ple may not be profitable enough. One way to square
these various circles is the well discussed device of
the Vaccine Purchase Fund, which would act as an
incentive to the private sector to do basic research
on poor country diseases and then, effectively, make
the findings available (at a price). From the point of
view of developing countries, the Vaccine Purchase
Fund is indeed an IPG, a positive unidirectional ex-
ternality from the Fund to the countries as a whole.
But once again the question arises – is there
anything other than the Bank’s financing in the final
product of the IPG? In the case of the Vaccine Pur-
chase Fund (rather like in the case of the HIPC fund),
it is clear that the Bank’s “convening role” has been
important, that (along with a small number of indi-
viduals and foundations) it was able to nurture the6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 19
basic idea and then expand it out to other partners to
the point where it could become operational. This
convening and incubating role will be discussed
again in the next section.
As a final example of World Bank practice in
the supply of IPGs, let us consider its role in pro-
ducing research on the development process itself.
The World Bank, in particular, projects itself as the
“Knowledge Bank”, and sees its role as a synthe-
sizer of country-specific development experience for
the benefit of all countries – an IPG. While the Fund
does not project itself quite so aggressively in this
mode, it offers the general experience of its staff in
a range of countries to policy makers from specific
countries, and it also has a large research depart-
ment. Taking the World Bank specifically, there are
two major issues of interest. First is the actual mecha-
nism through which the vast amount of information
generated by its operations is synthesized – much is
made of the role of new information technology in
this process. But secondly there is the issue of how
and in what framework the synthesis takes place.
Leaving to one side complex technical and in-
stitutional issues of managing knowledge flow, the
central issue is that frameworks for understanding
and interpreting information and knowledge in the
development process are contested. In this context,
the Bank can take an open stance of allowing a range
of issues to be debated and discussed, with dissent-
ing voices invited and given their proper place, or it
can present a particular synthesis and stand behind
it to the exclusion of other perspectives. In practice
the outcome is somewhere in the middle, with a defi-
nite stance on some policy issues (for example capital
account liberalization till a few years ago, and trade
liberalization now), which reflect and are reflected
in country specific operations, but a more open stance
on others (for example, on reducing gender discrimi-
nation).
Is Bank (and Fund) research an IPG? It is clearly
non-rival, in the sense that once the output of the
Bank’s research goes on to its comprehensive
website, access by one person anywhere in the world
does not diminish access for another. And the Bank
does a very good job in wide dissemination of its
findings. It is also non-excludable in the sense that
anyone who wishes to have access to the Bank’s re-
search can in principle do so. But this is a case where
satisfying these technical criteria is not enough –
we have to look deeper into the consequences of
making this research available widely. The conse-
quences depend upon whether the research is
believed, and by whom. To the extent that there is a
perception, and perception is what matters, that the
research is blinkered and dedicated to showing par-
ticular results, it will not have a general impact. In
this context, effective mechanisms of collecting, or-
ganizing and disseminating information through
electronic means can only deepen suspicion. The
recent discussion of civil society’s deep reservations
on the Development Gateway is a case in point.10
The central question is whether research in in-
stitutions like the Bank, who have to take stances
and views on policy in their operations, can ever
command wide enough trust to be an IPG. This in no
way is to impugn the motives of the many fine indi-
viduals who do research in these institutions. But
they do face constraints, and this is entirely to be
expected in an operational organization. The point
is not whether there should or should not be a re-
search organization in an operational institution –
any such institution will need a group dedicated to
specific analysis and to interacting with outside
analysis. The point rather, is whether IFI research
can claim the mantle of an IPG, and thence the aura
and the resources that flow from it in the current
climate favouring IPGs. Our conclusion on this is a
sceptical one, at least when there is a widespread
perception that the research is in service of a par-
ticular line or policy stance to the exclusion of others.
This is perhaps more likely in social science research
where, unlike research in the natural sciences, much
of the terrain is contested and there is no uniform,
unifying framework in which research and its find-
ings can be assessed.
IV. Reform to promote IPGs
Almost by definition, IPGs will tend to be
undersupplied in the world. And this undersupply
will often adversely affect developing countries. The
World Bank is engaged in a wide variety of activi-
ties whose direct (and sometimes indirect) objective
is to supply various types of IPGs. Indeed, it (and
other international agencies) is using this fact of IPG-
related activities to argue for continued support in a
climate where conventional development assistance
is out of favour. Before this argument is accepted, it
is worth asking whether there are reforms that could
make the Bank better at supplying IPGs. The theory
of IPGs in section II and the review of some exam-
ples of World Bank practice in section III suggest
some useful directions.7 International Financial Institutions and International Public Goods
Let us start with the (reasonable) assumption
that over the next ten to fifteen years the World Bank
will essentially remain an organization the bulk of
whose operations are country specific projects and
programmes. As noted earlier, we do not consider
here the argument, increasingly stridently made, that
since development itself is an IPG, the Bank’s (and
other agencies’) country programmes should be sup-
ported as IPGs. Suffice it to say that the argument
hinges on the efficacy of these country programmes
in promoting development, and the debate on that
will continue. What is important for us here, how-
ever, is that the culture of the institution, and the
bulk of its detailed knowledge and experience, is
and will continue to come from its country opera-
tions. Reform of the Bank to promote the supply of
IPGs will have to take this basic fact on board, and
weave a pragmatic path between current reality and
the ideal suggested by the theory of IPGs.
Recalling the discussion of spillovers between
adjacent developing countries in section II, a coor-
dination mechanism requires simultaneous actions
by a number of countries, and financing the costs of
these actions, as well as the costs of the coordina-
tion mechanism itself, is an IPG. The fundamental
disconnect between the requirements of the theory
and Bank practice is that the Bank (IBRD or IDA)
enters into loan agreements with individual coun-
tries, while what is clearly needed, if the loan route
is to be pursued, are creative mechanisms whereby
a number of countries can jointly be made a loan.
This expansion of the scope of Bank lending is the
first implication of the reasoning developed in this
paper.
To the extent that multi-country loans are dif-
ficult to develop and roll out because of structural
impediments in a sovereign debt framework, this
argues strongly for the development of grant instru-
ments as a normal part of the Bank’s country
operations. There is of course a big debate about
whether all of the Bank’s operations, certainly in
the poorest countries, should be on a grant basis.
The practicality of financing coordination mecha-
nisms between adjacent developing countries adds
its weight to the side of the debate arguing for con-
version to grant instruments. Thus greater use of
grants is the second set of operational implications
of an IPG-focused look at the World Bank’s opera-
tions.
The theoretical principle of subsidiarity states
that it should ideally be regional level institutions,
not a global institution like the World Bank that
should be addressing cross-border spillovers between
small numbers of adjacent countries. In the short term
there is often a strong argument for continued or even
strengthened World Bank involvement in these lo-
cal level IPGs. But over the long term there should
be a strengthening of regional institutions to deal
with these issues, through transfer of knowledge and
skills. To the extent that the World Bank’s financial
resources are used for this, they will be helping to
supply IPGs indirectly. A similar argument can be
made for strengthening sectoral organizations that
are currently relatively weak but are needed on IPG
issues – health and WHO is an obvious example.
Thus a systematic programme of strengthening of
regional and specific sectoral organizations is thus
the third operational implication of our reasoning.
On basic research into tropical agriculture and
tropical diseases, World Bank practice and IPG
theory are quite closely aligned; there are spectacu-
lar successes in the past and promising avenues being
pursued currently. An expansion of financial re-
sources into these operations is strongly suggested.
However, there is scope for reform of World Bank
practice from a closer examination of theory and
practice. First, given that for the foreseeable future
the bulk of the Bank’s operations will be country
specific, there should be a systematic attempt to feed
in the lessons of country practice into these global
initiatives; and this would give a substantive strate-
gic role to the Bank over and above its financial role.
The details of this need to be worked out, of course,
but the key is the word “systematic” – the use of
new technology to collect and collate information
through to global initiatives is something at which
the Bank should excel.
But the experience of the various successful
global initiatives highlights a second issue. In a
number of cases the Bank played a central role as a
catalyst, using its convening power, and then took a
less central role in discussions while perhaps main-
taining its financial role intact. This “entrepreneurial
role” of the Bank has been useful in the past and
should be maintained and strengthened. This requires
a certain amount of “blue sky thinking” to identify
problems and potential solutions, and to start down
the road of global consensus building on the issue.
An expanded fund for pursuing such innovative ideas
on IPGs, perhaps through an expanded Development
Grant Facility is thus the fourth operational impli-
cation of the arguments in this paper.
As noted in the previous section, the Bank
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ence research into the development process itself,
and to dissemination of the findings of this research.
The Bank as a whole no doubt has a huge base of
experience to report on from its country operations.
A systematic and independent collation of this in-
formation would be an IPG. Reform suggests itself
first of all in developing mechanisms that will en-
able raw information to be accessed the world over.
New technology holds out some hope in this regard,
and the Bank is already moving in this direction.
But there is the fundamental problem referred to in
the previous two sections. Social science is not like
natural science. It is contested terrain to a much
greater extent. Moreover, the Bank as a whole can-
not possibly be viewed as an independent arbiter of
social science research. It is owned by the rich coun-
tries, and it has operational policies that need to be
defended. These features mean that social science
research done by the Bank itself cannot fully lay
claim to the mantle of an IPG. The issue is sharply
seen in much of the “cross-country regression analy-
sis” that is done at the Bank. Whatever one’s views
on the quality of this research, there is weak com-
parative advantage justification for this type of
research to be done at the Bank – it does not rely on
information peculiarly available to the Bank because
of its country operations, nor on methods and tech-
niques that are peculiar to the Bank. The fifth and
final implication of the reasoning in this paper is
that more of the research at the Bank should be
farmed out to Universities and transparently inde-
pendent institutions, where at least perceived
independence will enhance its value as an IPG.
V. Conclusion
To summarize, the arguments in this paper have
(at least) five implications for the operations of the
World Bank. First, the development of multi-coun-
try loan instruments. Second, a stronger move in the
direction of grant instruments, which will mean an
increased charge on net income. Third, the use of
grants to support build-up of key regional and
sectoral organizations. Fourth, an increased use of
grants to support basic research initiatives, and in-
novative development of new IPGs, through an
expansion of the Development Grant Facility. Fifth,
a greater farming out of social science research to
independent institutions.
This paper has only begun the systematic and
detailed investigation of international aid agencies
as suppliers of IPGs. It has focused on the World
Bank, but many other agencies – the IMF and vari-
ous UN specialized agencies, in particular – can and
should be subjected to the same scrutiny. The de-
tails of the practice will differ in each case, of course,
as will the application of the theory of IPGs in each
case. Such analysis will contribute to an overall sense
of what resource reallocation is needed in interna-
tional agencies to address undersupply of IPGs. At
the same time, it will highlight overlaps and dupli-
cations in the supply of IPGs. All international
agencies are claiming their activities are essential
as providers of IPGs, and they cannot all be right.
But the case of the World Bank itself, as the
biggest aid agency of all needs more detailed analy-
sis than has been possible here. We have used broad
budget headings to characterize country specific
operations and different types of multi-country op-
erations that could be interpreted, or have been
claimed by the Bank to be, IPGs. With the availabil-
ity or more detailed budgets – more detailed than
those available publicly in the Annual Reports – a
more careful accounting would be possible to sort
out items under country operations that should be
reclassified to country specific operations and vice
versa. While this may not lead to a big change in the
overall proportions, it is an exercise worth doing. A
concomitant of this exercise, however, would be a
much more detailed set of operational and resource
reallocation implications than the general ones
developed here. For example, the overall set of
activities currently lumped under Networks, Devel-
opment Economics and World Bank Institute need
to be examined against the criteria of IPGs. A more
fine-grained conclusion on the research budget could
then be reached.
There is, finally, a “big” question that we have
left untouched. This is the issue of the World Bank
(or the IMF) as an IPG per se. The IDA part of the
Bank, for example, coordinates and acts as the chan-
nel for aid flows whose origins are not the Bank’s
own borrowing or its net income, but flows from
donor countries that they have chosen to send through
this mechanism rather than through direct bilateral
arrangements. It is argued that in this sense IDA pro-
vides the IPG and, it is argued by some, because of
this mechanism aid flows are greater than they oth-
erwise would be, and hence developing countries
benefit as well. This is a different argument from
multi-country activities that IDA funds could sup-
port, or the positive externality that country specific
use of IDA funds generates as the country in ques-
tion develops and grows. Rather, it is that this
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ter than others, better specifically than the alterna-
tive of all bilateral flows, and in providing this very
mechanism the Bank provides an IPG. In the end,
this may turn out to be the strongest IPG argument
in favour of the World Bank.
Notes
1 JEL Classification: F0, H4, O1, O2.
2 The rising interest in the policy arena has led to an ex-
plosion of analytical work at the intersection of IPGs and
development assistance: see, for example, Jayaraman and
Kanbur (1999), Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison (1999),
Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), Sagasti and Bezanson
(2001), Gerrard, Ferroni and Mody (2001), Arce and
Sandler (2002) and Ferroni and Mody (2002).
3 There are a number of studies that set out the basic theory
of public goods. See for example Cornes and Sandler
(1996) or Sandler (1998) or Kanbur, Sandler and
Morrison (1999).
4 There is of course a huge literature on aid effectiveness.
Some recent examples include: Burnside and Dollar
(2000), Tarp (2000) and Kanbur (2000).
5 There are a number of other theoretical considerations
that will not be considered further in this paper. One ex-
ample is how exactly actions in different countries con-
tribute to the public good. These issues of the technol-
ogy of public good provision are dealt with, for exam-
ple, in Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999), Kanbur, Sandler
and Morrison (1999) and Arce and Sandler (2002).
6 This is further discussed in Kanbur (2001).
7 The figures that follow are from the annual report of the
World Bank (2001), Appendix 1, “World Bank Expendi-
tures by Program Fiscal 1997–2001”. The table can be
downloaded from http://www.worldbank.org/
annualreport/2001/pdf/appendix.pdf.
8 Of course, this is a very rough and ready order of magni-
tude calculation. Sometimes under development Econom-
ics and World Bank Institute will support country opera-
tions, just as some times under Regions will support
multi-country activities. A more sophisticated analysis
can be conducted with more detailed budgetary data.
9 Other initiatives like the regional Water Initiative for
Middle East and North Africa, http://lnweb18.worldbank.
org/mna/mena.nsf/Sectors/MNSRE/AA7510D24
BEE223C85256B58005A5026?OpenDocument, are at
the stage of seminars and meetings, with “normal” project
activity projected some time into the future.
10 See Wilks (2001). For a discussion of the pressures on
the World Bank from its major shareholder, see Wade
(2002).
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